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Our paper attempt to identify the types of data needed to estimate
tradeoffs between wages and fringe benefits (such as pensions); it also
explores the usefulness for this estimation of one particular employer—
based data set collected by Hay Associates. We stress three things:
first, that employer—based data sets are required. Second, because pensions
and many other fringe benefits are actuarial functions of wages or salaries,
these technical relationships must he accounted for in estimation. Third,
to take account of unobservable heterogeneity of employees across employers,
one must use econometric methods that control for these unobservable variables.
The paper concludes with a discussion of our attempts to estimate the
tradeoff between wages and fringe benefits using a unique database for
200 establishments that contains information on wages and actuarial valuations
of employer costs of fringe benefits at three different job levels.
Robert Smith
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Fringe benefits are a growing component of total compensation,
and their growth presents a number of challenges to economists on both
the scientific and policymaking level. For example, when the government
passes legislation requiring that pensionsbe made more generous or more
widely available, it is natural to ask just who will pay the costs.
Economic theory, as we will show, is quite clear on. this point. It
suggests that when pensions increase wages will decrease,other things
equal——thus implying that it is workers themselves who will paythe
costs of pension reform legislation. The view that wages and pensions
are negatively related (if other things are held constant)is not widely
held among non—economists, however. Casual observation, in fact, yields
quite the opposite view. The highest—wage workers receivethe best pensions,
and high—wage firms are the very ones with the most generous pensions.
Even sophisticated studies that attempt to control for the"other things"
influencing total compensation sometimes estimate that wages and pensions
are positively related (Blinder, et. al. 1979).
To take another example, federal/private sector wage comparability
studies have historically ignored fringe benefits. If increases in earnings
and increases in fringe benefits are roughly proportional withineach sector,
then changes in earnings may serve as an adequate index (given the costof
acquiring fringe benefit data) for changes intotalcompensation. }1cwe'.er,
if as economists suspect, earnings and fringe benefits are e1related
within each sector, other things equal, then comparability studiesthat2
ignore fringes could be seriouslydeficient.
Finally, many labor market studies thatshould be measuring and
analyzing total compensation focusinstead on wages or earnings owing to the
general paucity of fringe benefit data.If marginal changes in wages and
fringe benefits are proportionally related,other things equal, these studies
may not contain fatal biases;however, if such changes can be shown tobe
inversely related, then problems of unknown magnitudecould arise in such
important areas as judging sectorswith labor surpluses and shortages, assess-
ing the existence and size of compensating wagedifferentials, measuring the
returns to human capital investments,and measuring the "unexplained
residual" for minorities and women.
Common to the above examples is the problemof estimating the trade—off
between wages and fringe benefits,While estimating this trade—off might
appear on the surface to be astraight—forward matter of obtaining data on
fringe benefits, we will show inthis paper that it is not. Instead, there
are potentially serious biasesthat arise when standard data sets areused.
Thus, if we are to successfully shed lighton the important issues of wage—
fringe trade—of fs, some rather uniquedata requirements must be met.
This paper represents an inquiry into someof the data—related diff i—
culties inherent in estimating wage—fringetrade—of fs, and it explores the
usefulness of a particular source ofdata in meeting these difficulties.
In the following section (section A) webriefly present the theory
underlying economists' notions aboutthe trade—of fs between wages and fringe
benefits. Section B discusses the uniquedata required to test this theory,
and section C describes a test usingsuch data. In section D tests for3
wage—fringe trade—of fs using conventional data are described and analyzed
for the purpose of assessing the extent ofanybiasesthat arise when such
data are used. The paper concludes with a section on data recommendations.
A. The Theory of the Wage—Fringe Relationship
Economic theory of the relationship between wages and fringe benefits
in competitive markets starts with the notion that it is totalcompensation
that matters to employers. They are trying to maximize profits, and inso
doing will endeavor to assemble a labor force of sufficient quality and
size to enable them to produce output that they can sell at competitive
prices. To attract the desired quantity and quality of labor requires that
they offer a compensation bundle the total value of which is at least as good
as other employers are offering. However, if they offer total compensation
that is too high, they will find their costs are such they cannot compete in
the product market. The result of these forces is that they will offer total
compensation that is no more or less than is offered by other employers to
workers in the same labor market. In short, for every type of worker or
skill grade, there will be a "going rate" of total compensation that firms
must pay.
Employees, on the supply side of the market, will of course want to
obtain offers that are as large as possible. They will find, however, that
firms are unwilling to offer compensation packages that are more in total
value than the going rate. Their problem, then, is to choose the package
whose composition best Suits their tastes.
The employer and employee sides of the market, discussed above, are
summarized graphically in Figure 1 using pensions as an example of a fringe4
benefit.This graph looks at the relationship between pensions and wages,
and itimplicitlyassumes all other job characteristics and elements of
compensation are already determined. We have argued that employers must
pay the "going rate" in terms of total compensation, and that at this
compensation level they will be competitive in both the labor and product
markets. The employer side of the labor market can thus be represented by
an "isoprofit curve"——a curve along which any combination of wages and
pensions yields equal profits to the firm. The isoprofit curve shown,
XX, is the zero—profit (competitive) curve, and it implies that the firm
must pay $X in total compensation to be competitive in the labor market.
If we ignore, for the moment, the effects of pensions on absenteeism,
turnover and work effort, the firm's total costs will be the same whether
the firm spends $X on wages or $X on pensions; hence, the isoprof it "curve"
shown is a straight line with a slope of unity (in absolute value). If all
firmsin the labor market depicted by Figure 1have isoproft curves with a
unitary slope (disregarding sign), the "offer curve" facing employees in
that market will be a straight line (XX) with the same unitary slope.
While the assumption underlying Figure.l is one of a linear offer curve
with a slope of unity, the locus of offers could trace out either a straight
line or a curve that has a slope the absolute value of which is greater (or
less) than unity, depending upon whether the presence of pensions reduces
(or enhances) worker productivity. Specifically, suppose pension plans that
do not offer immediate vesting reduce employee turnover and increase employee
work effort (Lazear 1979, 1981). Some firms might thus find that the marginal
dollar spent on increasing pension benefits would entail a net cost of less
than a dollar; this phenomenon would tend to flatten the isoprof it curves5
drawn in wage—pension space. On the otherhand, if pension benefits (or
other fringe benefits) are essentially independent of hourscurrently worked
per year, firms with relatively generous pension plans and correspondingly
lower wages may find that they experiencegreater absenteeism than they other-
wise would (Allen 1931). Thus, one could alsoargue that isoprofit curves
can have a slope greater than unity in absolute value.
If the cost—reducing effects of pensions always dominate thecost—
increasing effects, but the marginal effect of an additional dollar ofpen-
sion benefits on costs diminishes with the level ofpension benefits, then
the isoprofit curve, and hence market offer curve will havea concave shape
as shown in Figure 2 (the curve yy). In contrast, if firms with isoprof it
curves whose slope is always greater than unity in absolute value coexist in
the market with those whose isoprofit curves havea less—than—unitary slope,
the locus of offers to employees could fall along aconvex curve ——QRST1
as shown in Figure 3
The above arguments concerning the offercurve, which are derived
from an analysis of the employer side of the market,suggest that the
problem facing employees is one of choosing the compensation package that
maximIzes utility. That is, the observed compensation packages in a
given labor market will trace out the offer curve that exists atany
point in time, and the package chosen by any employee will reflect his or
her utility function. The exact shapes of employee indifferencecurves in
wage—pension space are not critical to our analysis, although linear or
concave indifference curves would in genera1 lead to corner solutions
(in which case a variety of wage/pension "mixes" would not be observed
in a ivcn market). We have thus drawn the indifference curves in6
Figures 1, 2 and 3 as convex. Are there other reasons to suppose these
indifference curves are convex?
In the life cycle context, workers could be viewed as maximizing a
lifetime stream of utility; thus, different wage—pension combinations
could simply be viewed as different asset portfolios. However, given
one's tastes, the marginal rate of substitution between wage goods and
pensionsis likely to be diminishing. As wages are increased and pensions
arereduced, more of one's total compensation becomes taxable (at progres-
sively increasing rates) at the relatively high tax rates that prevail
during one's working years. These relatively high and increasing rates tend
to progressively increase the amount of pretax wages employees would require
to compensate them f or successive reductions in pension benefits, Conversely,
as wages are reduced and pension benefits are increased, less of one's total
compensation becomes accessible for current expenditure——a fact suggesting
that workers will be willingtoaccept ever—smaller wage reductions in
return for progressive increases in pension benefits.' Thus convex
indifference curves in wage—pension space seem likely to exist.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 and the associated theory behind them suggest three
things about the relationship between wages and pensions. First, they
suggest that employees pay for their own pensions through a lowered wage.
That is, there should bea negative wage-pension relationship once other
things that affect compensation have been controlled for (as they have by
assumption in both figures). Second, theory also suggests that the above
negative trade—off might be close to (or fluctuate around) unity. Third,
the observed trade—off could be linear, convex, or concave.7
Similar reasoning about how labor markets work leads us, more generally,
to expect that the trade—off between wages and fringe benefit, cetcris
paribus, will be negative. Moreover, when such benefits are expressed in
terms of employer cost, the trade—off we can observe should be close to
unitary. Thus companies with a more generous fringe benefit package will
tend to pay lower wages, other things equal.
The theoretical considerations noted here suggest the outlines of
an empirical study wherein the determinants of wages could be estimated by
an equation such as
(1) W a + a P + a F + a X +e, 0 1 f x
where W is the wage or salary paid to workers, P is the present value of
2
yearly per—worker pension accruals (normalcost ),Fis the employer cost
of other fringe benefits per worker, X is a vector of all other factors that
influence wages or salaries, and e is a random error term. The coefficients
a1 are to be estimated, and it is predicted that a1 and af will be negative
and close to unitary in absolute value.38
B. Data Requirements
While equation (1) appears to offer arather simple empirical test, to
estimate it requires data that do notnormally exist in standardhousehold
or firm surveys. In particular,equation (1) imposes three datarequire-
ments that are difficult to meet. First,the variables P and F requirethe
availability of data on employers' costsof fringe benefits. That is, we
need to have access to estimates of"normal pension cost" and the costof
other fringe beriefits—---Which in many casesrequires actuarial estimatesthat
take into account employee turnoverand other factors affecting the proba-
bility that they will be eligible for,or choose to receive, a givenbenefit.
These data can only be found in p,yer—based
data sets——and even there only
rarely.
Second, many fringe benefits are
explicitly stated as a functionof
wages, so that detailedinformation on the determinants oftheir actuarial
value are required to estimate (1)
in an unbiased way. W and P in equation
(1), for example, are closely
related for more than the behavioralreason
suggested by theory. They arerelated in a very technica1 sense,because
pension benefits are normallycalculated as some fraction of wages.We are
interested in the behavioral relationship,not the technical one, butthe
latter relationship (which is a
one) may obscure the former (which
we hypothesize to be negative).We must therefore find a way tofilter out
the technical from the behavioralrelationship.
One very simple filtering process
consistS of specifying that P (normal
cost) is a linear function of Wand a vector (g) of all pensioncharacter
istics (vesting, replacement rates,COLAadjustments,etc.):9
(2) Pb +b W+b +u. 0 1
One could then proceed to estimate equations (1) and (2) using a two—stage
least squares estimator. Whatthisessentially involves is regressing P
on all independent variables in (1) and (2) except W. Using these
regression estimates, an instrument for P (call it F) is calculated and
entered as an independent variable in equation (1), replacingP.4 The
variable P is an estimate of normal cost that is "purged" of the effects
of wages. Using P in (1) thus would allow us to observe the behavioral
relationship.
Variables that belong in vector Z are thus necessary to an unbiased
estimate of equation (1). Like actuarial estimates of the cost of fringe
benefits, these variables are not commonly found in data sets; however,
when they can be had, they are found only in data sets.
The third need is for measures of the variablesin vector X—-the
bother things" that influence wages. Economists normallyuse data on
education,age, race, sex, marital status,and soforth to control for
thesethings, but such variables are not usually found in data
sets. Thus, we must either find ways to match employer and household
data sets or take pains to address some 'rather severe problems inherent
inemployerdata.
In particular, it is likely that a firm——through its use of hiring
standards and a particular compensation package——will assemble a fairly
homogeneous work force. However, its work force will tend to systematic
ally vary from the work force in other firms in characteristics that are
very difficult to measure: motivation, dependability, competence, and10
aggressiveness. In using employer—based data,the problem created by
firms' employment of homogeneous workers whodiffer in unmeasureable ways
from those employed in other firms is theclassic one of "omitted variables
bias." Firms that offer higher total compensationwill in general be able
to select employees with higher motivation,dependability, etc. High—ability
workers thus receive higher wages and higher fringebenefits, so that unless
data on ability are available, the fringebenefit variables in equation (1)
will pick up the effects of ability. A positivebias on the coefficients
of the fringe benefit variables is thus distinctlypossible when one is
using a data set in which worker qualityis unobservable and potentially
varies across firms.
Previous studies we have done on the wage—pensiontrade—off in the
public sector do not appear to havesuffered much from the above problem
of omitted variables bias (Ehrenberg and Smith,1981). The local government
employers in these data sets were hiringworkers-—police, firefighters and
nonuniformed employees——Who all worked in the same"industry" and had very
similar duties across cities; thus, itis unlikely that employee quality
varied substantially across cities. However,when one moves to tests for
wage—fringe trade—offs in the private sector,homogeneity of worker quality
across employers is much less likely.The managers of a company producing
sophisticated technical equipment are likelyto have different character-
istics than those in a trucking firm,and those in highly competitive indus—
tries are likely to differ from thosein a public utility. One purpose of
this paper is to inquire into the significanceof, and a solution to, this
problem of unmeasured heterogeneityof workers across firms.11
C. Estimating Wage—Fringe Trade—Of fs
We were able to obtain an employer—based data set that generally
met the requirements outlined in the previous section. These data were
provided to us by flay Associates, a large compensation consulting firm.
Hay conducts its own survey of cash and noncash compensation within client
firms and was able to provide us with a sample of roughly 200 usable
observations. The sample has several rather unique characteristics.
Controls For Other Influences on Wa
First, salary and fringe benefit data were prbvided to us for three
different white collar job grades within each company. Hay evaluates
every job within a client company using three principal criteria: required
"know—how," accountability, and the degree of problem—solving involved.
It assigns point values to each job characteristic, totals them, and uses
these "Hay Point" evaluations as points of reference when comparing com-
pensation within and across firms.
We were interested in obtaining the compensation associated with
given Hay Point levels as one means of controlling for the "other things"
that influence wages, Thus, we asked Hay to provide us with data at three
different Bay Point levels in each of the firms: 100 Hay Points (entry
level white collar job for someone with a Eachelor's degree), 200 Hay Points
(supervision of a small staff section), ax.. 400 Hay Points (lower middle
management position or a department head in a small organization). It
normally takes 3—6 years to go from a 100 to a 200 Hay Point job, and
7—15 years to go from a 100 to a 400—point position within an organization.12
Another crucial advantage
to obtaining data ondifferent job grades
within each companY isthat it permits one toemploY a procedurethat,
in effect, controlsfor the firm—specific
effects of unmeasuredworker
characterist1 For example,suppose thatsalaries at the 100—HaY
Point level are given bythe following variantof equation (1):
(3) oo a0 +a1P100 + af F100
+ a X + a M + e,






similar equation describes wages
at (say) 400 HayPoints:
(4) w400a + a1 P400 + af F400
+ aX + a N +
The assumptions
equations (3) and(4) are that the wage—
fringe trade—of fs (a1
and af) are the same ateach Hay Point level,but
that the intercept terms(a and adiffer. We also assumethat the
0 0
coefficients Ofl thevariables in the x vector
differ, but that the X
variables (firm size
and industrY, f orexample) are the same ateach Hay
Point level within afirm. Finally we assumethat the unobservableworker
acteriStjcS (N) are
constant within a firmand that their marginaleffects
(a) are the same ineach equation (in effect,
they add a constant
absolute amount tocompensation at each joblevel within a givenfirm).
Subtracting equation (3)
and (4), we arrive at anequation that
explains the eflCe








One can note from (5) that the unobservable effects of worker quality
drop out of the equation (we are explaining within—firm wage profiles now).
Thus, having access to compensation data at different job grades within
firms should allow us to work around at least some of the problems of
omitted variables bias.
jyer Cost Data on Fringe Benefits
Thesecondunique feature of our data set is that it contains
actuarial estimates of employers' costs of all privately—provided fringe
benefits——pensions, paid vacations and holidays, medical—dental plans,
death and disability benefits, and capital accumulation plans (prof it—
sharing or stock options). The means of each element in total compensation
(excluding government—mandated items) are displayed for each Hay Point level
in Table 1. In the case of pensions, death and disability benefits, and
capital accumulation plans, values shown indicate the present value of the
estimated increase in firmliabilitiesaccruing during a year.
Data on Pension Characteristics
A third feature of our data set is that it Contains information on
several important pension characteristics: the effects of Social Security
benefits on the pension benefits promised by the firm, eligibility andvesting
provisions, replacement rates, cost—of—living adjustments to benefits, death
benefits, and retirement age. The means of several of these pension
characteristics are summarized in Table 2. These data permit us to estimate
wage equations using theinstrumentalvariables procedure outlined in section
B——the purpose of which is to purge the wage equation of the technical
dependence of pension costs on wages.14
Unfortunately, the actuarialcalculations of capitalaccumulation
and death/disability benefitvalues were highly complexand we were not
provided with sufficientdata to meaningfullY purgethem of their technical
dependence on wages. Oursolution to this problem was to
a one—for—
one trade—off betweenthem and wages and move thevalues of these three
fringe benefits from theF vectors to the left—handside of equation (5)-—
adding them to salaries andW400) to form and respectivelY.
The 11atinS EquatiOfl
The wage equations we ultimatelY
estimated had the form
(6) L W a + a1 (iSP) + a3F+ a4(S) + a5 (T) + adD +e",
where tW is the change insalaries plus death, disabilitYand capital
accumulation fringe benefits from oneHay Point level toanother within a
firm; tP is the change in pensionvalue from one Hay Pointlevel to another
(an instrumental variable,P, was substitutedforAP as noted above); LF
is the change in days of paidleave from one Hay Pointlevel tO another (the
value of medical—dental plans
dropped out of the vectorF because it was
constant across Hay Pointlevels within a firm); andthe observed firm
characteristics variables are firmsize (S), a dichotomousvariable taking
the value of 1 if the firmhas a mandatory retirement policy
and 0 if it
does not (T), and vectorof industry dummy variables(D). The mandatory
retirement variable, T, is
included because firms with mandatoryretirement
may well have steeperearnings profiles than thosethat do not (Lazear 1979).
The average company sizein this sample was 12,360 employeeS,
and 50% were
in manufacturing industries.
No firm in the sample requiredpension con-
tributions of its employees.15
Equation (6) was estimated using thetwo—stageleast squares procedure
outlined in Section B. To simultaneously estimate the "normal cost" function
approximated by equation (2) in the context of explaining salary differen-




Thevariablesin Z include the replacement rate (assuming workers retire at
age 65 with 30 years of service), whether or not employees are immediately
members of the pension plan, whether or not the plan fully vests after 10
years of service, whether or not benefits are adjusted to reflect cost—of—
living increases, whether or notdisabilityretirement provisions are pre-
sent, the degree to which retirement benefits are offset by social security
benefits, and whetheror not anassumption of future salary increases was
made in the actuarial calculation of normal pension cost.
Three versions of (6) were estimated: differences between 200 and
300 HayPoints,differences between 400 and 200 Hay Points, and differences
between 400 and100Hay Points. The results are presented in Table 3.
(Results of the first—stage estimation are presented in the appendix.)
The results of most interest for our current purposes, of course, are
the estimated coefficients on the pension and paid—leave variables. Of the
six estimated coefficients, only three have the expected negative sign——and
of those three, none is significantly different from zero at conventional
levels. Thus, the results of this test give no support for our theory of
the wage—fringe relationship.16
o possible explanationsfor these disappointingresults must be
considered. First, it is possible, as
noted earlier, that our procedure
for finding an instrument for1P in equation (6) is toocrude, so that the
relationshiP between P and P is not veryclose. This seems unlikely,
however, because as can be seenfrom Table A.1 in the appendix,the variables
in the first stage of ourestimating procedure explain
55—60% of the variance
in tSP.
Second, our assumption thatunmeasured employee characteristics
add
a constant dollar amountto total compensation ateach Hay Point level may
be incorrect. A tractablealternative assumption is thatthese unobserved
characteristi affect total compensation
at each Hay
6
Point level.Suppose, for example, thattotal compensation at any hayPoint
level can be expressed as
(a + a X + M + u)
(8)W(l+p+f)AC
°X
where p and f are employers' costs
of pensions and other fringebenefits
expressed as a fractionof wages, and 4 is the fraction bywhich marginal
changes in unmeasured employee
characteristics increase totalcompensation.
Taking logs and using thefact that 1n(1 + r) :rwhen r is small, equation
(8) can be approximated by
(9) in Wa0
+ aX + 4M + a1p + aff + u,
where a1 and af are predicted tobe negative and equal to unityin absolute
value.
The effects of unmeasured employee
characteristics, 4H, can beeliminated
by differencing equation(9) across hay Point levelswithin a firm to obtain17
(10) (lnW)a +a1(p)+ af(sf)+aX+,
whereindicates the change in the relevant variables across flay Point
levels. Because tp will in general depend on changes in salaries across
Hay Point levels, equation (10) was estimated using the instrumental
variables approach analogous to that explained earlier.7 The results
of major intetest are shown in Table 4.
As with the results presented in Table 3, those in Table 4 offer no
support for the theory outlined in section A. We will return to a brief
discussion of these negative findings in section E. However, before doing
so, it will be instructive to consider the biases that could exist if
alternative procedures or data were used.
D. The Potential Biases Using Standard Data Sets
Sections B and C emphasized two potential biases in estimating wage—
fringe trade—offs using conventional data sets. First, unless account is
taken of the technical dependence of many fringe benef its on wages, the
behavioral trade—off will be obscured. We dealt with this potential bias
by using an instrumental variables approach. Second, it is possible that
workers in roughly the same jobs will differ widely in certain unmeasurcable
characteristics across firms; that is, workers within firms may be fairly
homogeneous, while across firms they may not be. The procedure we adopted
in section C to deal with this problem was to purge the estimating equations
of firm specidc "fixed—effects" of these unmeasured characteristics by
analyzing within—firm salary changes. In this section we analyze these
two potential biases by investigating what happens when the above problems
cinnot be circumvented owing to lack of data.18
Ordinary Least Squares y mesof Eguation (6)
Suppose that we had data onemployers' "normal cost" of pensions,but
that we did not have information on
the characteristics of the pensionplan.
This lack of data would preclude ouruse of the instrumeiltalvariables
approach described in section C,and we might be forced to use anordinary
least squares estimating procedure.
at would be the consequencesof
this defect in our dataset?
The ordinary least squaresestimates of the coefficientsof major
interest in equations (6)and (10) are given in Table5. These estimates
demonstrate very clearly the strong
positive bias that emergeswhen one
is unable to control for thetechnical dependence of pensions onwages.
Estimated coefficients on the pension
variables, which were close to
zero and smaller thantheir standard errors inTables 3 and 4, are all
strongly positive here. Thus,
data sets that do not permitthe researcher
to disentangle thetechnical from the behavioralrelationship between wages
H and pension costs will yieldbiased estimates of thetrade—off.
EstimatesIgnoringFirm-Specif Fixed Effect
Supposenow that we had access todata on employers' fringebenefit
costsand pension plan characteristics,but that we had only oneobservation
per firm. Lackingthe data required to filterout the "fixed effects"of
unmeasuredworker quality within a firm, onewould have to attemptto
estimatetrade—offS across firms at afixed skill level. Estimatesof
equations like (3),(4)and (9)ateach of the three Hay Pointlevels,
using our instrumentalvariablesapproach described earlier,but of course
omitting the variable N, weremade in the course of ourresearch. The
results of major interest are reportedin Table 6.19.
In equations using the levels of salaries and fringe benefits, one
can see (by comparing Tables 3 and 6) that ignoring the fixed effects of
unmeasured worker characteristics does not alter the size or quality of
the estimated wage—pension trade—off. However, ignoring these effects
imparts a very definite positive bias to the trade—off between wages and
paid holidays. Further, the fact that the estimated coefficient grows
more positive as one moves up the Hay Point scale tends to suggest the
effects of unmeasured characteristics may also tend togrow absolutely
larger as workers are promoted. Generally similar observations can be
made by comparing the results of our logarithmic specification in Table 4
with the corresponding results in Table 6. Thus, there is clear evidence
that omitted variables bias associated with unobserved worker characteristics
is a problem that must he addressed when generating a data set for the
purpose of estimating wage—fringe trade—of fs.
E. Data Recommendations
This paper has attempted to identify the data needed to estimate
trade—offs between wages and fringe benefits, and it has sought to explore
the usefulness of one particular data se.tin this context. We have stressed
that meaningful estimates of these trade—of fs require data possessing three
somewhat unique characteristics. First, estimates of the of any
trade—offs require employer cost data——which, for many fringe benefits,
entails actuarial estiraation. Thus, researchers must have access to employer—
based data of a detailed nature.
Second, because pensions and many other fringe benefits are actuarial
functions of wages or salaries, this technical relationship must be accounted20
for when estimating the
behavioral relationshiP of interest.The data
required to do this properlyare those othervariables also affecting the
actuarial value of fringebenefits. In the case of pensions,data on
replacement rates, vesting,COLA adjustments, the existenceof death or
disabilitY benefits, and thelike are required. We havedemonstrated that
ignoring this issue canresult in seriously biasedestimates.
Finally, heterogeneity of employeesacross employers presentsresearch-
ers using employer—baseddata with potentially severe
problems of omitted
variables bias. Unmeasured
within—firm worker characteristicswill tend to
affect wages and fringesin the same direction, thusimparting a positive
bias to the estimatedcoefficients on fringe benefits.We attempted to
circumvent this problem byobtaining multiple observations perfirm a'd
analyzing within—firm compensation
changes. While these procedureselimi-
nated the counter_the0rt
al estimates of a strong positivetrade—off
between wages and paidholidays, they did notallow us to find the predicted
trade—off between wages andfringe benefits. In pointof fact, we found
no evidence in ourdata set to support the predictions
of theory.
Explaining our negativefindings cannot be donewith certainty at this
point. It may bethat the theory iswrqflg, orat least not predictiveof
"real world" behavior. Givenour earlier findingsfor the public sector,
we are reluctant tOembracethis explanation—-at least
until the weight of
replicative findings mounts up.It may also be that ourtheory is correct
but that it is difficultto isolate the wage_fringe
benefit trade—off in
the private sector; othernonpecuniarY job
characteristicS (e.g., working
conditions) may vary systematicallY.
Another explanation, whichis emphasized
in more detail by CharlesBrown in his comments thatfollow, is that in the
presence of long—termimplicit contracts betweenemployees and firms, the21
relevant trade—off may be between the present values of life—time wages and
pension benefits, not between wages and pension benefits at any particular job
level. In a world in which such long—term contracts are important, one can not
test the theory by focusing on specific job level trade—offs, as we have
attempted to do.
A fourth possible explanation is that the particular data set we had
measured skill level and fringe benefits with so much error that estimates of
existing negative trade—offs were biased toward zero, This possibility receives
support from some of the errors we encountered in using the data and from the
wide, overlapping ranges of salary levels at each of the three Hay Point levels
(see the note to Table 1). It may be that the Hay system of job rating is so
arbitrary that across—firm comparisons are rendered essentially meaningless——
and that the actuarial estimates of fringe benefit costs are so crude as to be
unreliable. However, the Hay Point system of job evaluation is perhaps the
foremost rating system of its kind in the world, the company is large and employs
a battery of actuaries and other specialists, and the data we used were derived
from a routine survey used and paid for by its clientele. It is hard to recon-
cile the hypothesis of sloppy or meaningless comparisons with the reputation and
continued prosperity of the Hay company. If their work is of poor quality,
would not they be punished by the market?
While we. cannot answer the preceding question, there remains a fifth
possible explanation. Perhaps the lack of data on employeecharacteristics
caused the poor results. It could be that, despite our best efforts, we
were really not able to completely avoid the positive biasesasscciated
with the problem of unmeasured worker characteristics. If this explanation
is correct, it would suggest that some means must be found to include
employee characteristics into employer—based data sets. It suggestsin22
other words, that unless theemployerbaseddata researchers must use contain
information on the education, experience,training, etc. of employees,
unbiased estimates of wage—fringetrade—offs may,notbe possible. e
recommend, the, that to the threedata requirements discussed atlength
in this paper, a fourth beadded. Namely, cmployerbaseddata sets should
either include measures of averageemployee characteristicsdirectly, or
they should contain sufficient
identification so that they canbe ctOSS
referencedto employee—based data sets.Smith —Ehrenberg
Table 1
Means of Hay Compensation
Data Per Year
HAYPOINTLEVEL
Salary $13,434 $20,646 $34,862
Pension Value 816 1,450 2,870
Value of Vacations 1,334 2,057 3,490
and Holidays
Death Benefit Value 234 346 595
Disability Benefit 447 694 1,221
Value
Capital Accumulation 385 600 1,034
Value
Medical—Dental Plan 1,114 1,114 1,114
Value (Same for
all H.P. levels).
Note: Therange(standard deviation) of the salary data are as follows:




on Selected Pension Plan
Characteris tics
Percent of plans with full vesting 72%
after 10 years
Percent integrated with Social 87%
Security
Percent with formal or informal 45%
COLA
Mean replacement rate for 30—rear 56%
employee with a salary base of
$25,000
Mean replacement rate for 30—year 47%
employee with a salary base of
$50 )000






















Uiatcs ef quation 6)
ctermInants of the ChangeinSalary
FringeBenefits Across Hay Point Levels Within Fit-ms















**ifldiC3tCS significance at the .Olvelnd itthe .Oeve1 with otte—tU tests en allvariables except firssize and the indutrydutisTable 4
Estimated Wage—Fringe
Trade—Off s, Equation (10)
EstimatedCoefficient (standard error) on
gion Pensions (a1) Paid Holidays(af)
400 H.P. *100H.P. .359(.687) —.362(1.555)
200 H.P. —100ILP. .136(1.049) 1.615(2.553)
400 H.P. —200H.P. .373(.682) —.175(.958)Tabic S
Estimatesof theWage-FringeTrade-Off
Using Ordinary Least Squares
to Estimate Equations (6) and (10)
EtiinatedCoe ff Ictent (standarderro r) on
Pension
(a1) Paid Holidays (af)
Equation (6): 400 fl.P.-400 H.P. 1.513(.323) 60.809 (174.922)
200 fl.P.—100 H.P. 2.391 (.379) 318.369 (153.482)
400 I1.P.-2OO H.P. 1.609 (.324) 40.730 (141.333)
Equation (10): 400 H.P.—100 H.P. 1.247 (.501) -.585 (1.538)
200 H.P.-100 H.P. 2.268 (714) —.185 (2.415)
400 fl.P.—200 H.P. .926 (.451) —.259 C.951)Table 6
Estimates of the Wage—Fringe Trade—Off
Ignoringthe "Fixed EffeCtS"
ofUnmeasured Worker Quality
Estiriated Coefficient (standard error)on
Pensions(a ) PaidHolidays (a )
pendentVariable ___________
SalaryLevel at 100 H.P. —.006 (.686) 140.291 (75.550)
200 H.P. —.059(.512) 330.955 (102.806)
400 H.P. —.126 (.480) 529.145 (146.000)
Log of Salary at 100 H.P. .506 (.590) 2.445 (1.386)
200 H.P. —.187 (.509) 2.284 (1.227)
40011.?, —.635 (.451) 2.403 (1.034)Yearly
Wage
Figure 1
The Trade—Off Between Wages

























XX' (pensions do not ch3nge productivity)






1. tThile in theory people could borrow against their future pension
promises, capital markets are not likely to be so perfect that they
can do so without facing interest rates that rise with thesize of
the desired loan.
2. "Normal cost" is the actuarial value (in the present) of the increase
in pensionliabilities incurred during the current year——or the yearly
contribution to the pension fund needed to keep it fully—funded.
3, Equation (1), of course, restricts the wage—fringe trade—offs to be
constant (linear). Alternative specifications of this "basic" equation
wouldallow the trade—offs to benonlinear as suggested by our discussions
ofFigures 2 and 3. While for the sake of convenience our analysis of the
data and estimation problems will center on equation (1), we will briefly
discuss our results using other functional forms.
4. Equation (2) can be viewed as a linear approximation to the complex
way in which pension benefits are actually computed. There is no reason,
of course, to think that a linear approximation is sacred, and future
researchers might use more complex forms (e.g. higher order polynomials)
to increasetheprecisionof the instrument for P that isobtained. We
should note,however, that this linear approximation has been used with
some success in prior research (Smith 1981).5. Equation (7) is derived byassuming the following equations hold for
(say) the 400 and 100 Hay Point levels:
(7a) P400b + b1 W400 + b Z + u"
(7b)
Subtracting(7b) from (7a) results in equation (7), where
anduu—u.
6. We are indebted to Charles Brown forthis suggestion.
7. For reasons discussed earlier,fringe benefits except "paid days off"
wereadded to thesalary variable.SmithEhrcnbcrg
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by Regressing P on
All Exogenous Variables in
Equations (6) nd (7)
Estiratcd Coefficients (Standard Err6rs)
Variable 400—100H.P. 200—100H.P 400-200_fl.P.
PaidHolidays 26.65(28.06.) 27.07(23.42) 26.39(22.98)
Firm Site +1000 .02(1.33) .41(.47) .38(.98)
Firm Size Missing (0,1) 210.89(122.12) 87.37(42.77) 123.41(89.66)
Durable Mfg. (0,1) —25.84(122.62) —22.57(43.77) —3.04(90.41)
Non Durable Mfg. (0,1) 147.69(128.57) 46.45(45.80) 101.46(94.74)
Trans., Public Utility (0,1) —39.38(161.87) 75.29(56.90) —114.61(118.69)
Service Industry (0,1) 221.33(173.21) 91.94(61.27) 129.58(127.27)
Mandatory Retirement (0,1) 82.83(85.94) 33.62(30.27) 49.19(63.05)
Pension Replacement Rate ,21(.03) .07(.01) .13(.02)
Immediate Membership in Plan (0,1) 157.32(90.80) 63.59(31.99) 93.73(66.59)
Full Vesting at 10 Years (0,1) —85.73(101.23) —22.60(35.74) —63.19(74.27)
COLA Provided to Benefits (0,1) 467.12(92.12) 118.35(32.37) 348.79(67.45)
Disability Retirement Allowed (0,1) 67.18(93.36) 13.64(33.31)53.41(63.56)
Social Security 0fset, Flat Z .56(.53) .09(.19) .48(.39)
• Social Security Offset, Yearly Level 14.61(17.02) .67(5.98) 13.93(12.48)
Social Security Offset Capped by Max. 3.86(4.59) .88(1.61) 2.98(3.37)
Social Security Offset by Step Rate.(0,1) 187.97(144.84) 23.24(51.48) l6...58(106.14)
Actuarial Assumption of Rising Salaries (0,1) 12.38(94.63) 24.82(33.32) —12.56(69.67)
Intercept 218.19(163.65) 59.10(57.67) 159.06(119.89)
It2 .60 .54 .58